

BYE-2849-65

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Special Activities, Directorate of Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Implications of SAM Site Mobility for IDEALIST and OXCART Programs

REFERENCE: BYE-2849-65, Same Subject, Dated 26 August 65

1. Reference requested our views re the implications to IDEALIST and OXCART programs of the Soviet tactics being employed with the SA-2 system in North Vietnam. The use of mobility combined with suppression of FAN SONG emissions in order to maximize the ability to surprise strike aircraft represents the tactical application in a shooting war of tactics previously used by the Chinese against the IDEALIST reconnaissance program. The latter was reported formally in a joint memorandum, The Chinese Communist SAM Capability (DST-JM/BYE 65-1, 11 January 1965), and had earlier been the subject of informal discussions and was reflected in reports prepared for the 303 Committee and in vulnerability studies prepared for OSA. The activity in North Vietnam represents a much more rapid use of these tactics than was required of the Chinese in establishing traps for reconnaissance aircraft. (For a discussion of these tactics in North Vietnam, see the joint DDI/DDS&T memorandum, SA-2 Mobility in North Vietnam, OCI No. 2309/65, dated 24 August 1965.)

2. The [] program for the OXCART vehicle considered these tactics as a fundamental part of the program requirement. Therefore, considerable emphasis has been placed on developing equipments to determine when the OXCART vehicle was the subject of SA-2 reaction. These programs include means of warning the pilot when he was being illuminated by the FAN SONG's tracking beams

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BYEMAN TALENT KEY TO USE-COMBAT
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

OXCART

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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as well as intercept of the missile guidance signal. Additionally, systems for detection of the launch of the missile (both active radar and infra-red systems) have been under development for the vehicle. These, and the countermeasures systems, were part of the OXCART program because of the very short time required to establish an SA-2 site and, therefore, the inability of the program to depend upon other means of surveillance to establish a firm and sufficiently timely SAM order of battle.

3. The IDEALIST program has also been affected by the same considerations. This has been the factor behind the developments of [REDACTED]

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The impact of these tactics has been more severe in respect to the IDEALIST program than to the OXCART program, because the U-2 does not operate as near to the margin of effectiveness as does the A-12. Thus, the assurance that the systems employed will reduce the risk to the U-2 to an acceptable level is markedly less than for the A-12. In fact, when the Communist Chinese begin to have larger numbers of SA-2 systems (or a follow on system) deployable in larger numbers, the degree of risk for the U-2 will become unacceptable. Survivability of the U-2 at present depends largely upon careful flight planning to avoid SA-2 defended locations combined with the defensive systems for those hopefully only occasional situations when the Chinese have been able to anticipate the targets and make a surprise emplacement of a SA-2 system. On the other hand, the OXCART vehicle with the [REDACTED] packages should have a low risk in the face of a more extensively deployed SA-2 system in Communist China.

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6. This office will continue to analyze defensive systems and tactics which may affect the IDEALIST and OXCART programs and will continue to advise you of their impact on a basis as timely as possible.

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DONALD F. CHAMBERLAIN
Director of Scientific Intelligence

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